Introduction
Recently, a Taipei-based Smartphone company, HTC, promoted a series of distinct classes of Smartphone's in the European market, aiming at drawing more different consumer groups to enlarge market shares. In that case, his downstream retailer will face a problem on how to set retail prices in response to the marketing strategy. If the high-class phones are overpriced, some of potential buyers, who originally intend to purchase the phones, might choose the low-class but relatively cheap ones instead; contrarily, those who initially prefer the inexpensive low-class phones could opt to purchase the expensive high-class ones due to the insignificant price gap if the high-class phones are underpriced. Of these two situations the former damages the retailer's profit because of demand leakage from high-priced phones to low-priced phones who possess meager profit by comparison; and the latter also impairs his profit because of the high-priced phone's diminishing profit margin. This study therefore tackles this problem from the viewpoint of supply chain that a manufacturer manufactures two newsvendor-type items and offers a buyback commitment to a retailer, who helps sell the items in stochastic demand environment with various prices allowing demand leakage from high-priced item to low-priced one.
A number of extant publications in the literature have termed revenue management as one of the most pressing topic in the field of management science and operation research since large revenue generally yields large profit (Bell, 1998) ; and a commonly used strategy to increase revenue is to differentiate a single market into multiple sub-market segments through various prices mainly enticing more buyers, which accounts for why many firms usually offer discount prices for earlier purchases and online purchases alike. Gerchak et al. (1985) primarily dealt with the relevant problem whether a limited supply of bagels should be sold as a single item with higher price or as part of other combination with lower 398 price; and later, consumers are partitioned into two sub-groups by Pfeifer (1989) with price-sensitivity and price-insensitivity to investigate airline discount fare allocation problem. Shi and Chen (2007) analyzed Pareto-optimal contracts for a newsvendor supply chain with satisfying objectives. Lately, Zhang and Bell (2007) and Zhang et al. (2010) initiated a model of two demand classes associated with demand dependency allowing demand leakage across the segments, from where the result of total expected profit of two variously priced sub-market segments always outstrips that from a single market segment is identified. Wang et al. (2013) also discussed this two demand class's model. They developed a critical level rationing policy in which a threshold mechanism is adopted to allocate backorders when multiple outstanding orders exist.
A supply chain is called to be coordinated if it reaches a possible maximal channel profit as a whole by virtue of contractual terms negotiating among the chain members. And a traditional price-only contract is a trade whereby manufacturer does not offer any incentives to retailers; wholesale prices are the only decision variables between them (Lariviere and Porteus, 2001). A return policy contract, however, is a commitment provided by upstream member to accept unsold stock of downstream members at the end of selling season; in practice, it actually helps ease nervousness on being overstocked, especially in a market full of demand uncertainty. Unlike the Larivieve (1999) who reported that the priced-only contract fails to coordinate supply chain, a benchmark paper by Pasternack (1985) expressed that channel coordination could be accessible by means of the return policy implementation. Thus two existing types of return policy are extensive discussed: the first is a complete return policy that promises to refund a buy-back price (smaller than wholesale price to avoid arbitrage opportunity) for each returned unit; the second is a partial return policy that reimburses retailer wholesale price only for part of unsold stock, usually a certain percentage of order size also known as the quantity flexibility (Tsay, 1999) . Based on the policies, Lariviere (1999) accordingly derived a mathematical equivalence between the two return policies under stochastic demand environment. Also, Bose and Anand (2007) handled the pertinent issue by first adopting the partial return policy and then extending to the complete return policy with same approach in a framework of single-period problem.
In competitive newsvendor environment, ordering decisions are assumed to be set simultaneouslythere is no priority or time sequence among competitors; each competes with others by satisfying a market with substitutable products. Parlar (1988) verified the existence of unique Nash solution for two vendors in this situation; Netessine and Rudi (2003) sequentially generalized Parlar's result to the case of any number of vendors. In contrast with the competitive environment, a Stackelberg game includes a leader and other followers; the leader first sets contractual terms and then makes optimal decisions after knowing the followers' responses, aiming to earn higher profit than that in competitive game. Bose and Anand (2007) coped with the game focusing on one manufacturer and one vendor supply chain with exogenously fixed wholesale price, where the manufacturer maximizes his expected profit subject to participation constraint of the retailer's optimal profit; and with aid of numerical examples, channel coordination of the constrained Nash equilibrium is claimed. Later, Yao et al. (2008) conducted a string of examples regarding the game in light of the price-only and the return policy contracts, along with a conclusion that the return policy contract actually improves channel profit; in the case of high demand variability, they further suggested that manufacturer is supposed to split some profit to continue the game, a similar result appeared in Lau and Lau (1999), Lau et al. (2000) and Tsay (2001) . Besides that, Serin (2007) stressed on two-vendor problem with initial and reallocated demand considerations, core value of which is that, under certain condition on profit function, problems of two-player type (Nash game) and leader-follower type (Stackelberg game) share common optimal solutions in inventory management. Unlike the papers above, Serel (2008) studied a single-period problem assuming that retailer could place his order from a reliable supplier, a risky supplier or the both, in which the retailer is making optimal ordering decision on how to divide his order between the reliable but high-cost supplier and the unreliable but low-cost supplier.
In this study we zero in on a 1-leader-and-1-follower type of newsvendor supply chain that the manufacturer, who is a leader offering a complete return policy, maximizes his expected profit by determining wholesale prices and buy-back prices under the constraint of the retailer's optimal expected profit, who is a follower determining optimal retail prices and optimal order sizes in a stochastic demand market. The contributions of our study are twofold. Firstly, we successfully derive a succinct model for the 399 two-item supply chain that is rather complicated since demand leakage and buy-back policy are taken into account altogether. Secondly, due to interdependence of the two leaking demands, widely used software packages are unable to directly solve the problem; we thus develop a solution method of iteration that will be proven valid by means of a string of examples, accompanied with graphical concavity and satisfying constraint of the manufacturer's expected profit.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Assumptions and notation are made in Section 2 incorporating with pertinent models formulation and corresponding theoretical analyses. In Section 3, an iterative solution procedure to optimize the case of uniform distribution of error demand is developed so as that many numerical examples are conducted to show the validity of our solution method. Finally, remarks on the study and possible directions for further research are presented in Section 4 to complete the study.
The model
The problem of this study is defined as follows. A manufacturer manufactures two newsvendor-type items and offers a complete returns policy contract to a retailer who sells the items in a stochastic demand market. For item i , i=1,2, wholesale price, buy-back price, retail price and order size are i w , i b , i p and i Q , respectively; unit production cost i c and unit shortage cost i s for unsatisfied demand are also incurred.
Following Zhang and Bell (2007) , the deterministic parts of the items' demands allowing leakage from highpriced item to low-priced one are defined by
Where, for i=1,2, i  >0 is a primary demand; i  >0 is a consumer's price-sensitivity;  >0 is a leakage rate. Then, based on Mills (1959), the items' stochastic demands are given by
Where, for item i, i  is an error demand defined on a range
ii AB with pdf () ii f  and cdf
According to the previous assumptions, for i=1, 2, the retailer's profit from the item i is calculated by
Applying the scheme in Thowsen (1975) 
Thus the retailer's total expected profit is 
, the retailer's expected profit can be re-written as follows.
Notice that each term of [] r E  owns managerial meaning itself. The first term implies a profit coming from the deterministic part of the demand; the second term is an expected profit associated with the error demand; the third term is an expected cost due to overstock; and the last term means an expected shortage cost and an expected profit loss due to unsatisfied demand. 
Then corresponding Hessian matrix is
The first principal minor of H is
The second principal minor of H is 
As to the manufacturer's expected profit, we have the following outcome.
Theorem 2. The manufacturer's expected profit is in the form of
Derivation of the manufacturer's expected profit
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Then the manufacturers expected profit is
We note that the proposed models are applicable to any type of distribution of error demand. But, because of difficulty in analyzing the problem, we plan to explore it with the assumption of uniformly distributed error demand, and then provide a simple solution procedure to conduct many examples, aiming at showing the validity of our solution method.
The numerical examples
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the error demand 
Meanwhile, the retailer's and manufacturer's expected profits to the case of uniformly distributed error demand respectively become 
